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Getting It Right by Getting It Wrong: How the Supreme 
Court Helped Healthcare Reform by Incorrectly 
Applying the Standard of Review in Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Healthcare reform has proven to be a puzzling creature. As the 
number of citizens without healthcare coverage swells, and the specter of 
increasing healthcare costs looms large in the minds of nearly every 
person, it is fairly obvious why the topic of healthcare reform is a 
powerful and poignant issue today. Nearly forty-six million American 
citizens do not have any healthcare coverage, including coverage from 
public assistance programs such as Medicaid or Medicare.1 
Complementing this staggering number is a wide consensus amongst 
Americans that the system for providing healthcare coverage is broken 
and needs to be fixed.2 And yet, despite overwhelming recognition that 
change is required, reform has come falteringly, and has been largely 
ineffective. 
This Note seeks to address one area of healthcare reform by 
examining the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh3 
(hereafter called “Walsh”) in terms of its contribution to the healthcare 
reform debate. I first consider the issues that gave rise to the suit filed by 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (hereafter called 
“PhRMA”), including an explanation of the Maine Rx Program, which 
stands at the core of the dispute. After a close examination of the 
reasoning set forth by the opinions of the Walsh decision, I propose that 
the plurality’s approach to addressing the case is procedurally unsound, 
given the controlling standard of review pointed out by the dissent. 
Nevertheless, the plurality’s decision to hold in favor of Maine Rx, even 
 1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2004, 16 (2005). 
 2. One public opinion poll placed healthcare reform as the fourth “most important problem 
for the government to address,” above taxes, the budget, terrorism, national security, education, and 
crime. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, March/April2005 Health Poll Report Survey, 
Apr. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/March-April-2005-Kaiser-
Health-Poll-Report-Toplines.pdf. 
 3. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
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if only in the context of reviewing a preliminary injunction, is desirable 
because it ultimately provides support for the proposition that human 
lives are of greater value than lost profits. Furthermore, the Court’s 
reaffirmation of presumptive constitutionality in the case of legislation 
involving Medicaid programs may aid effective healthcare reform by 
providing more ammunition to state legislatures as they assert their 
position as the proper forums for resolution of healthcare problems.4 
Finally, this Note looks at subsequent treatment of the case in remand 
proceedings, noting especially the implications of the Walsh decision for 
the future, and concludes that the plurality’s “inadvertence” may well aid 
healthcare reform more than many intentional undertakings. 
 




Medicaid itself has long been a very controversial subject.6 Indeed, 
one author has observed that while the Medicare program has always 
enjoyed solid popularity, the Medicaid program has endured a tenuous 
and difficult existence since its passage as part of the Social Security Act 
in 1965.7 Medicaid’s controversy is presumably due to public concerns 
about rising costs, as well as a certain apprehensiveness about socialized 
healthcare assistance programs.8
As set up by the “Medicaid Act,”9 Medicaid is a federally-subsidized 
healthcare coverage option for certain qualifying individuals, wherein 
each State administers its own version of the program. States largely 
determine for themselves what benefits to grant, and set eligibility 
requirements for determining which individuals will be covered, subject 
to certain federally imposed threshold requirements.10 Under those 
requirements, state Medicaid programs must extend healthcare coverage 
 4. I recognize that whether the states truly are the best forums for healthcare reform is a 
premise with which some might take issue. There are many compelling arguments for why states are 
better able to deal with healthcare reform than the federal government, but they are outside the 
immediate scope of this work, and I will not address them here. For a well-crafted treatment of five 
such arguments, see Carol S. Weissert’s article, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to 
Universal Health Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 42 (2004) (discussing 
healthcare reform in terms of moving towards universal health insurance). 
 5. This summary of the Medicaid system is distilled from BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 772–76 (West 2004) (1987). 
 6. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 772. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (2000). 
 10. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 773–75. 
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to citizens who are aged, blind, or permanently and totally disabled, and 
whose income is below or very near to the federal poverty line.11 
Agencies administering the Medicaid programs term this group of 
mandatory beneficiaries as the “categorically needy.”12 In addition to 
providing for the “categorically needy,” States may choose to (and often 
do), extend eligibility for Medicaid coverage to a broader group based 
upon calculations of financial need.13 In this manner, States are given 
considerable leeway in defining the formulae used to calculate eligibility 
for Medicaid coverage.14 Historically, as long as the States crafted plans 
that extended benefits to the “categorically needy,” the federal 
government remained aloof from most other aspects of administration.15 
Today, States do cover those with pressing medical needs, whose 
incomes, according to federally proscribed guidelines, are significantly 
depressed.16 However, States also cover a significant portion of 
individuals and families who would not otherwise be eligible under the 
federal minimum standards.17
Drug benefits under State Medicaid plans, like other covered 
benefits, are extended to qualifying applicants via the eligibility schemes 
of the various states, as described above.18 At first, there were only 
minimal federal guidelines for States to follow, mostly setting upper 
limits on state spending for prescription benefits.19 States took the liberty 
of instituting various regulatory plans to administer drug benefits to 
Medicaid beneficiaries. Many of these plans attempted to control 
increased drug spending, which was widely viewed as the product of 
rising drug costs.20 One such program was the so-called “prior approval 
plan.”21 If a State chose to place a drug on a prior approval plan, all 
doctors prescribing that medication within that state had to obtain prior 
 11. Id. at 773–74. The federal poverty level is determined by reference to the size of a 
household, that household’s income, and location of the household in either the forty-eight 
contiguous states, Alaska, or Hawaii. The federal poverty level for a single-member household 
located within the contiguous states in 2006 is $9,800.00 per year. For a household of four similarly 
located, the 2006 federal poverty level is $20,000.00 per year. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty 
Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 3848 (Jan. 24, 2006). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i). 
 13. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 774–75. 
 14. See id. at 774, 779–81 (discussing state discretion in extending coverage to certain groups 
of applicants and in providing certain benefits). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. at 774–75. 
 17. Id. at 774. 
 18. See id. at 773–75. 
 19. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 651 (quoting M. Ford, Congressional Research Service Report to 
Congress, Medicaid: Reimbursement for Outpatient Prescription Drugs, CRS-1 (Mar. 7, 1991)). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 651–52. 
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approval from a state agency before the prescription could be filled.22 
Such cost-saving measures had been implicitly sustained for quite some 
time, and without much controversy.23 The first prior approval plans 
were simply approved by the Secretary of Health as a part of the States’ 
Medicaid plans as a whole, rather than addressed in their own right. 24 
This is presumably because the goal of these reforming states was to 
control Medicaid costs and they were not at that time directly regulated 
under the Medicaid Act. 25
Today, the Medicaid drug benefit is heavily supported by a provision 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,26 which requires 
drug manufacturers to grant a rebate on all drugs purchased for Medicaid 
patients.27 In return for the rebate, Congress forbids the States from 
excluding the drugs of participating manufacturers from their programs’ 
coverage.28 However, States are still allowed to place certain restrictions 
on the drugs of participating manufacturers, foremost amongst these 
being the prior approval plans, which Congress explicitly endorses.29 
Such regulatory plans were ostensibly ratified by Congress by 
amendment to the Medicaid Act.30 At present, States’ prior approval 
plans are specifically authorized by statute, so long as the States seeking 
to institute such plans maintain a reliable, quick, and efficient way of 
obtaining approval.31
Given Medicaid’s turbulent and controversial development,32 it is 
clear that the roles of the federal government and the States are often 
undefined, and there is substantial overlap between their efforts and 
policies, which frequently results in confusion, waste, and most 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. at 652. 
 24. The Secretary of Health is charged by statute with the duty of reviewing state Medicaid 
plans for compliance with federal mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b). 
 25. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 652. 
 26. 104 Stat. 1388, 13880 143–59 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8). 
 27. “The rebate on a ‘single source drug’ or an ‘innovator multiple source drug’ is the 
difference between the manufacturer’s average price and its ‘best price,’ or 15.1% of the average 
manufacturer price, whichever is greater. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(c)(1), (2). The rebate for other drugs 
is 11.1% of the average manufacturer price. See [42 U.S.C.] § 1396r-8(c)(3).” Walsh, 538 U.S. at 
652. 
 28. “[O]nce a drug manufacturer enters into a rebate agreement, the law requires the State to 
provide coverage for that drug under its plan . . . .” Id. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d). 
 30. Until recently, it was unclear whether placing a drug on a prior approval plan could be 
done unilaterally by the states. However, in the aftermath of Walsh, the Secretary of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, who is charged with the task of administering federal involvement 
in, and supervision of, the Medicaid program, has suggested that such an action now needs approval 
from the Secretary. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662 n.30. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A). 
 32. See supra text accompanying notes 6–8. 
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significantly, gaps in coverage.33 The mixture of regulatory oversight and 
independence has left many deficiencies and many questions about what 
States may do to reform their healthcare programs to help residents with 
no healthcare coverage without endangering continued federal Medicaid 
subsidization. A large portion of the American population has no 
healthcare coverage at all, and, presumably, an even larger portion has 
inadequate coverage.34 States are left on their own to determine how to 
address the healthcare needs of this substantial population. One 
particularly contentious issue is how States may use their Medicaid 
programs in connection with other State programs to solve this problem. 
This is a prominent point in the Walsh decision. 
 
B.  What is the Maine Rx Program? 
 
Many individuals who do not have any healthcare coverage at all 
also have no way to offset staggering prescription drug costs. But the 
problem is much broader than just those who have no coverage. While 
many people have some form of health insurance, these same people do 
not always have adequate drug benefits; indeed, many have no drug 
benefits whatsoever.35 The Maine Rx Program36 (hereafter called “Maine 
Rx”) is one State’s attempt to use certain aspects of the Medicaid 
program to fill a gap left by Medicaid coverage. 
 33. The complete absence of specific provisions concerning prescription drug coverage 
between 1965 and 1990 serves as an ideal example of how the development of Medicaid has largely 
been an ad hoc enterprise, which development has seen both the creation of, and subsequent 
attending to, gaps in coverage. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 651. 
 34. 45.8 million Americans were without any healthcare coverage for all or part of the year in 
2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2004, 16 (2005). Additionally, a recent survey revealed that 
61% of American adults who have had problems paying medical bills are covered by insurance, and 
a significant number of people [roughly 17% of American non-senior adults] reported not being able 
to pay for healthcare at all at some point in 2005, despite having some form of healthcare insurance. 
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH & USA 
TODAY, Health Care Costs Survey, Aug. 2005, at 3, available at 
http://www.kff.org/newsmedia/upload/7371.pdf. 
 35. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 1996, at 1 (1997) (stating that in 1996, roughly 84.4% of the 
American population was covered by some type of insurance continuously throughout the entire 
year); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Prescription Drug Trends, Oct. 2004, at *2, 
available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004-
UPDATE.pdf. (“In 1996, 23% of nonelderly Americans [excludes children and Medicare eligible 
individuals] had no drug coverage (more recent data are not available), including those without any 
health insurance for some or all of the year”). Cf THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
Health Care Costs Survey, supra note 34, at 7 (“Nearly one-quarter (24%) of Americans report that 
they or someone in their household did not fill a prescription, cut pills or skipped doses in the past 
year because of the cost”). 
 36. Codified as currently amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681 et seq. (West 
Supp. 2005). 
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In an effort to provide some relief from rising drug costs to Maine 
residents, the Maine legislature created Maine Rx to grant a wide-
reaching drug discount. Under Maine Rx, residents of Maine who do not 
have a comparable drug benefit could qualify for enrollment in the 
program and would thereafter be eligible37 to receive a discount roughly 
equivalent to wholesale pricing. The program calls for Maine’s 
Commissioner of Human Services to negotiate voluntary manufacturer 
rebates with pharmaceutical companies.38 These rebates are to be at least 
as large as those that are granted to the federal government under the 
Medicaid program.39 Maine then redistributes the rebates to participating 
pharmacies within the state, which sells the drugs at their discounted 
prices to enrollees.40
If a pharmaceuticals manufacturer chooses not to participate in the 
program, the fact of such non-participation would be deemed “public 
knowledge,” and Maine could “publicize” the name of the non-
participating company, and the fact of its non-participation to 
practitioners, pharmacies, and the general public.41 In addition, Maine 
could also place the non-participating drug(s)42 on a prior approval plan 
for Maine’s Medicaid population.43 As discussed above, such an action 
means that practitioners would need to obtain prior approval from the 
State before prescriptions for the non-participating drug would be filled 
for Medicaid patients.44 However, Maine also maintains rules exempting 
certain necessary drugs from the prior approval plan penalties, to ensure 
that Medicaid patients requiring essential medications are not unduly 
 37. Under the original Maine Rx statute, there was some controversy as to whether the 
program was open to all residents, or if it constrained enrollment in some way. Maine argued that 
enrollment was self-policing, as it would make no sense to use the program in lieu of a better private 
drug benefit, should one be available. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 655 n.14. Nevertheless, PhRMA argued 
that the bald language of the statute left enrollment wide open to all residents, thus requiring 
preemption by the Medicaid Act. Id. At that time, the statute read: “‘Qualified resident’ means a 
resident of the State who has obtained from the department a Maine Rx enrollment card.” ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(2)(F) (West Supp. 2002). This point was important for the dissent’s 
position that the statute did not facially promote any Medicaid related purpose, but is otherwise 
irrelevant to the topic of this Note. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 685–90. 
 38. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(4) (West Supp. 2002). 
 39. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(3)–(4)(C) (West Supp. 2002). See supra text 
accompanying note 27. 
 40. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(5)–(6) (West Supp. 2002). 
 41. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West Supp. 2002) (re-codified as ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7-A) (West Supp. 2005)). 
 42. It is conceivable that a pharmaceutical company would agree to grant a rebate on one 
drug and not another. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West Supp. 2002) (re-codified as ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7-A) (West Supp. 2005)); supra text accompanying note 22. 
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burdened by the plan.45
As can be seen from the prior discussion of early Medicaid 
provisions,46 the device itself that Maine uses under Maine Rx to 
encourage manufacturers to grant rebates is nothing new. In fact, the 
Court in Walsh notes specifically that even before prior approval plans 
fell under the rubric of federal oversight, such regulatory tools were very 
common.47 Before any litigation concerning Maine Rx began, prior 
approval plans had long been regarded as a perfectly acceptable way for 
States to control healthcare costs.48 The question at the heart of the 
litigation that spawned Walsh is simply whether it is acceptable to use 
them in connection with non-Medicaid as well as Medicaid-related 
healthcare purposes.49
 
III.  HISTORY OF THE CASE 
 
A.  Facts 
 
1.  Objections by pharmaceuticals manufacturers 
 
Unsurprisingly, pharmaceuticals manufacturers vigorously fought 
Maine Rx before it was even passed into law.50 There are many points 
about the program that pharmaceuticals manufacturers could find 
objectionable, not least amongst these being the effect that Maine Rx 
inevitably has on their bottom line. Maine Rx, ultimately, is little more 
than a cost shifting device, in that it reallocates the cost of providing 
Maine residents with prescription drugs to the drug companies 
themselves. It would be extremely dubious to say that Maine Rx does 
anything but force drug companies to eat some profits in order to 
continue doing business in Maine. 
Although reduced profits are most likely the single greatest 
compelling factor driving the subsequent litigation that has surrounded 
Maine Rx since its inception, it is not the only complaint that 
pharmaceutical companies have against the program. During legislative 
consideration of Maine Rx, PhRMA and other related groups took out 
full-page ads in Maine’s largest newspapers, “calling the [program] ‘a 
 45. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(11), (13)–(14) (West Supp. 2002); Rules of the 
Dep’t of Human Serv., § 15, Maine Rx Program (West Supp. 2002). 
 46. See supra text accompanying notes 20–31. 
 47. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 652. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm’r, No. Civ. 00-157-B-H, 2000 WL 
34290605, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000). 
 50. See infra text accompanying note 51. 
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cure that’s worse than the disease.’”51 PhRMA claimed that the bill 
would improperly restrict which drugs healthcare providers could 
prescribe, and could force Medicaid recipients and others to “take 
cheaper, less-effective medicines.”52 Additionally, the pharmaceuticals 
manufacturers argued that the program would also “have a chilling effect 
on research and the development of new drugs.”53 The validity of such 
contentions aside, PhRMA used these points extensively to bolster 
arguments against the program in its initial complaint filed in federal 
court.54
In Walsh, PhRMA argues that Maine Rx should be permanently 
enjoined from taking effect for two reasons. First, PhRMA claims that 
provisions of Maine Rx conflict with the Medicaid Act by “constrict[ing] 
the flow of prescription drug benefits to Congress’s intended 
beneficiaries of Medicaid.”55 To support its arguments in court, PhRMA 
uses much of the same hypothesizing and doom-casting it had conducted 
during ratification of the program during legislative consideration of 
Maine Rx. In particular, PhRMA calls upon expert witnesses to support 
its motion for injunction, who testify that, in their opinion, “prior 
authorization . . . for the purpose of influencing the manufacturer’s 
pricing behavior in another program . . . will lead to drugs being 
prescribed that are less safe and efficacious.”56 Furthermore, PhRMA 
asserts that there is no Medicaid-related purpose advanced by the 
program, as it is merely a front for “holding Medicaid patients’ 
prescription drug benefits hostage to the State’s fundraising efforts on 
behalf of [non-Medicaid eligible residents of Maine].”57 PhRMA 
concludes that since Maine Rx seeks to apply regulations that affect 
Medicaid recipients, and yet offers no Medicaid-related purpose within 
its text to suggest that it works in concert with Medicaid, it must 
therefore be in tension with the federal Medicaid statute.58 PhRMA calls 
for the Court to permanently enjoin Maine Rx because, under the 
 51. A. J. Higgins, Drug Bill Deal Reached: Compromise Aims to Cut Prices for Uninsured, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 11, 2000, at 1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did= 
53679436&sid1&Fmt=3&clientld=9338&VName=PQD. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Walsh 538 U.S. at 656–57 (citing PhRMA’s executives and experts presenting 
similar arguments in their affidavits to the district court). 
 55. Brief of Petitioner at 14, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) 
(No. 01-188). 
 56. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 657 (quoting affidavit of Dr. Howell of SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 662. 
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Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,59 federal law must prevail 
over state law when both attempt to regulate the same area.60 Thus, says 
PhRMA, Maine Rx is pre-empted by the federal Medicaid Act and must 
be enjoined.61
Second, PhRMA alleges that Maine Rx must be permanently 
enjoined because it tramples on the dormant Commerce Clause powers 
reserved to Congress62 by attempting to regulate commercial actions that 
occur almost exclusively extraterritorially, and by favoring Maine 
citizens over citizens of other states at the expense of manufacturers 
located exclusively out-of-state.63 It is important to note that PhRMA 
argues the rebate program is not voluntary, because penalties are 
attached to non-participation.64 Thus, PhRMA views Maine Rx as 
coercive, rather than participatory. In support of this view, PhRMA 
points out that “virtually all manufacturers’ sales of prescription drugs 
occur outside of Maine in transactions with wholesalers and 
distributors.”65 Given this fact, PhRMA insists that requiring them to 
give rebates would be tantamount to regulation of commercial 
transactions out-of-state.66 PhRMA argues, since most of the commercial 
transactions that will be affected by Maine Rx take place out-of-state and 
will benefit only Maine residents, the program essentially discriminates 
against interstate commerce in order to exclusively fund in-state 
participants.67
 
2.  Procedural posture 
 
The district court agreed with PhRMA on both68 of its arguments, 
adopting its reasoning virtually wholesale. The Court granted an 
injunction enjoining Maine from “penalizing manufacturers, by placing 
 59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 60. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662. 
 61. See id. 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Am. Trucking Ass’n. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
125 S.Ct. 2419, 2422 (2005) (succinctly reviewing the dormant Commerce Clause and supporting 
case law). 
 63. Brief of Petitioner at 26–38, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 
(2003) (No. 01-188). 
 64. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
 65. Brief of Petitioner at 29, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) 
(No. 01-188) (internal citations omitted). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 35. 
 68. The district court also agreed with PhRMA on its arguments against Maine Rx’s anti-
profiteering provisions, which the state later dropped when it appealed the Court’s decision, and will 
not be discussed further in this Note. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm’r, No. Civ. 00-157-
B-H, 2000 WL 34290605, at *2–*3 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000). 
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their drugs on [the prior approval plan], for refusing to negotiate or to 
pay a rebate to Maine’s Rx program.”69 On appeal, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court and vacated the injunction.70
 
B.  The Decision of the United States Supreme Court71
 
1.  The plurality 
 
Justices Stevens, writing for the Court, is joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer. These four form the core of the plurality, which 
begins by stating that it is not required to rule on the validity of Maine 
Rx, pointing out that the district court had conducted neither evidentiary 
hearings, nor formally resolved any factual disputes.72 In so doing, the 
plurality attempts to confine its decision to the injunction, and leave the 
rest to later proceedings.73
In addressing PhRMA’s preemption argument, the plurality states 
that the question presented is, presuming that the state statute is valid, 
“whether there is a probability that Maine’s program was preempted by 
the mere existence of the federal [Medicaid] statute.”74 The plurality 
rejects PhRMA’s contention that, because Maine had not put forth any 
Medicaid-related purpose to justify Maine Rx’s prior approval provisions 
before the district court, it had waived the existence of any such 
purposes.75 Rather, the plurality holds that a waiver theory is 
inappropriate in this case because Maine had never represented that there 
were no Medicaid-related purposes. Given the presumption of validity to 
which the plurality suggests the statute is entitled, and by virtue of 
PhRMA’s position as the party seeking the injunction, the burden is upon 
PhRMA to “establish[] by a clear showing, a probability of success on 
 69. Id. at *7. 
 70. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 97 (1st Cir. 2001). 
However, the Circuit Court also recognized that some Medicaid beneficiaries might encounter some 
actionable harm as a result of Maine Rx’s prior approval requirements, and thus reserved the right of 
such an aggrieved party to petition for a limited injunction at that point to readdress the matter in that 
context. See id. at 97–98. The Circuit Court’s reasoning was extensively addressed (and largely 
accepted) by the Supreme Court on certiorari, and is noted, where relevant, in sub-section B infra. 
 71. The Walsh decision is highly fractured. In addition to the plurality’s opinion, the Court 
offers three concurring and one dissenting opinion. The concurring opinions, offered by Justices 
Breyer, Scalia and Thomas, focus largely on substantive differences with the plurality’s treatment of 
PhRMA’s preemption argument. Because this Note is concerned with procedural aspects of the 
plurality’s opinion, which are not treated by these concurrences, I will not discuss them further. See 
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 670–83. 
 72. Id. at 660. 
 73. See id. at 660, 668. 
 74. Id. at 661 
 75. See id. at 662–63. 
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the merits.”76 Thus, if an injunction was to be granted, it is PhRMA’s 
duty to show the absence or impossibility of any Medicaid-related 
purposes, and not the other way around.77 From these premises, the 
plurality reasons that “if [Maine Rx] on its face clearly serves some 
Medicaid-related goals, it would follow that the district court’s 
evaluation rested on an erroneous predicate,” and thus, should be 
reversed.78 The plurality then proceeds to name three such facially 
apparent Medicaid-related purposes. 
First, the plurality agrees with the First Circuit Court that Maine Rx 
will extend benefits to individuals who can be classified within the 
Medicaid statute as “medically needy,” even if they may not be 
“categorically needy.”79 Justice Stevens reasons that the Medicaid statute 
explicitly authorizes States to extend benefits to this group of people.80 
He further notes that although PhRMA points to possible over-
inclusiveness81 as a sure sign that Maine Rx does not have a Medicaid 
purpose, “the potential benefits for nonneedy persons would not nullify 
the benefits that would be provided to the neediest segment of the 
uninsured population.”82 Second, the plurality also agrees with the First 
Circuit Court that Maine Rx might reduce Medicaid spending by aiding 
people in addressing illnesses earlier, so that they are not forced to enroll 
in Medicaid later when their illnesses are advanced, and are then much 
more costly to treat.83 Third, the plurality, sua sponte, presents a possible 
Medicaid-related purpose. The plurality argues that by simply using a 
prior approval plan for dispensing drug benefits to Medicaid patients, 
regardless of the State’s motivations therefore, the State will probably 
save money.84 Such savings have been demonstrated by earlier prior 
approval plans conducted by managed care organizations.85 The plurality 
suggests that controlling costs is a “rather obvious” Medicaid-related 
goal.86
By way of qualification, the plurality admits that although Maine Rx 
may serve Medicaid-related purposes, such possibilities would not allow 
support of the program against an application for injunction if it 
 76. Id. at 662. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 662–63. 
 79. Id. at 663. 
 80. Id. at 651. 
 81. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 82. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 663. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. at 663–64. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. at 663. 
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“severely curtailed Medicaid recipients’ access to prescription drugs.”87 
However, the district court’s reliance on the premise that “any 
impediment ‘[n]o matter how modest,’ to a patient’s ability to obtain the 
drug of her choice at state expense would invalidate [Maine Rx]” was 
misplaced, because minimal incursions on Medicaid beneficiaries’ 
benefits do not outweigh the State’s power of broad discretion in 
administering its own Medicaid plan.88 Nor do they outweigh “Maine’s 
interest in protecting the health of its uninsured residents.”89 As long as 
Maine assures “meaningful access” to its Medicaid beneficiaries, it does 
not truly matter what its motivations are for using its otherwise “broad 
discretion to define the package of benefits it will finance.”90
Finally, the plurality holds that “the impact on manufacturers that 
Maine Rx is sure to have is not relevant because any transfer of business 
to less expensive products will produce savings for the Medicaid 
program.”91
With regard to PhRMA’s dormant Commerce Clause arguments, the 
plurality, this time joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer, agrees with the First Circuit once more, 
holding that Maine Rx neither regulates prices of out-of-state sales 
transactions,92 nor does it tie the price of in-state products to out-of-state 
prices.93 Maine Rx does not impose special burdens on certain 
manufacturers, while favoring others, nor do the rebates that Maine Rx 
grants provide “special benefit to competitors of rebate-paying 
manufacturers.”94 Thus, Maine Rx does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
 
2.  The dissent95
 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, form the dissent in Walsh. The dissent does not so much 
 87. Id. at 664. 
 88. Id. at 665. 
 89. Id. at 666. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 668. 
 92. Here, the plurality observes that Maine is not insisting that drug-makers sell their 
products to specific retailers or wholesalers for a certain price, but merely elicit a rebate from all 
manufacturers alike. Id. at 669. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 670. 
 95. The “dissent” in Walsh also concurred with the plurality’s reasoning concerning 
PhRMA’s dormant Commerce Clause argument. It is because of this concurrence that I do not 
address their response to the dormant Commerce Clause argument again here. See supra text 
accompanying notes 92–94. 
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disagree with the plurality’s reasoning regarding PhRMA’s preemption 
claims, as it objects to the plurality’s conclusions and the means used to 
reach them. The dissent argues that the district court’s decision to grant 
the injunction was not an abuse of discretion, because Maine Rx does not 
demonstrate any prima facie Medicaid-related purposes, the intention 
behind its creation being wholly unrelated to Medicaid goals.96
The dissent adopts the “preemption test” articulated in Glade v. 
National Solid Wastes Management Association.97 The dissent, following 
Glade’s lead, argues that the correct standard is to review the structure 
and purpose of each program in order to assess whether the intent of 
Maine’s legislature in the passage of Maine Rx aligns sufficiently with 
Congress’ intent in the passage of the Medicaid Act.98 The dissent seems 
to suggest that under Glade, the key focus should be on the driving 
motives behind the programs’ passage.99 If Maine, in enacting Maine Rx, 
is pursuing the same ends that Congress pursued in the passage of the 
Medicaid Act, then the two programs are in conflict, and the Supremacy 
Clause mandates that the federal statute preempt that of the State.100 
Thus, the dissent concludes that “[a] State . . . may impose prior 
authorization to reduce Medicaid costs[,]” but may not “impose prior 
authorization to generate revenue for purposes wholly unrelated to its 
Medicaid program.”101 The dissent also argues that although there is no 
explicit prohibition on the use of prior authorization plans in the statutory 
language, the “purpose and structure” of the Medicaid Act inherently 
limits the usage of that mechanism for other-than-Medicaid-related 
ends.102
As the dissent notes in Walsh, Maine Rx specifically states that its 
purpose is “to reduce prescription drug prices for residents of the State, 
and it accomplishes this goal by threatening to impose prior authorization 
on otherwise covered outpatient drugs.”103 The dissent assumes that 
Maine Rx operates regardless of financial need, and therefore the 
program’s stated purpose reveals a motive incongruent with that of the 
Medicaid Act, which seeks to provide healthcare access to the poor.104 
Given that statutory language constituting Maine Rx does not evidence a 
 96. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 684 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 97. Glade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
 98. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 684–85 (O’Connor, J. dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 685. 
 100. Id. at 684–85. 
 101. Id. at 685. 
 102. Id. at 685–86. 
 103. Id. at 687 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(1), (2)(F), (7) (West Supp. 2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J. dissenting). 
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Medicaid-related purpose on its face, and that Maine did not advance any 
such purpose in the court below, and that there are no facts in the record 
supporting such purposes, the dissent concludes that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in granting an injunction against Maine Rx.105 
The dissent notably points out that in evaluating the granting of an 
injunction on appeal, the Court is not to assume that the district court is 
required to do factual contortions to find Medicaid-related purposes 
when no party advanced such arguments below.106
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
Having thus explored the background behind Walsh and the 
reasoning behind the plurality’s and dissent’s arguments, I now turn to an 
examination of these opinions and their effect on the pressing need for 
healthcare reform. I will hereafter attempt to show that the plurality’s 
assessment of the standard of review is incorrect, and as such, PhRMA 
should technically have prevailed in this case. However, I suggest that 
from a practical standpoint, the plurality’s procedural mistake resulted in 
the best possible overall outcome, given pressing concerns about 
healthcare reform. 
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s procedural flaws, the decision is 
still defensible. At its core, Walsh presents an ethically charged issue. 
Subtle legal packaging aside, the case ultimately asks the Court to 
balance human lives against corporate profits. Given this rather perverse 
calculus, I submit that equity requires the result the plurality reaches, 
even in the face of technical mandates to the contrary. Additionally, the 
plurality’s decision has great potential for encouraging state-sponsored 
healthcare reform, in that it affirms the right of the States to use their 
police powers to provide for their uninsured residents, even when the use 
of those powers implicates federal programs. 
 
A.  The Plurality Stumbles on the Standard of Review 
 
1.  The plurality’s shaky foundation 
 
As beneficial as the plurality’s position may be, because it is based 
upon an improper application of the standard of review, it is procedurally 
flawed at its foundation. While initially presenting the correct standard of 
review,107 the plurality thereafter seems to ignore that standard by 
 105. See id. at 689. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See infra text accompanying notes 108–18. 
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presuming the validity of Maine Rx on appeal. Despite the district 
court’s prior judicial determination that the statute was invalid, the 
plurality incorrectly holds that the district court’s grant of an injunction 
was erroneous because it did not raise Maine’s arguments sua sponte. 
 a.  The statement of the standard. Citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,108 
the plurality correctly recognizes that the standard of review here is 
whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding PhRMA an 
injunction.109 Doran sets forth the familiar and demanding standard for 
granting a preliminary injunction, which requires a plaintiff to establish 
both irreparable injury, should the injunction not be issued, and 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.110 Doran also states the standard 
of review for injunctions on appeal, specifically noting that “while the 
standard to be applied by the district court in deciding whether a 
plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is stringent, the 
standard of appellate review is simply whether the issuance of the 
injunction . . . constituted an abuse of discretion.”111 Since the Court 
is reviewing the award of an injunction in this case, the correct standard 
of review, as provided by Doran, is whether the district court abused its 
discretion in granting the injunction.112
It is well-established that acts of judicial discretion, such as the 
injunction at issue in Walsh, are given extreme deference upon review.113 
The abuse of discretion standard is incredibly accommodating towards 
the trial judge’s decision. By way of example, it is said that “a mere error 
of judgment is not abuse of discretion.”114 Much more than this, in the 
context of appellate review, abuse of discretion is often characterized as 
resulting “manifest injustice,” or decision-making that “is the result of 
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will[,]” or decisions that are “arbitrary or 
capricious,” “against logic and the facts and reasonable deductions to be 
drawn therefrom,” or so erroneous “as to shock reason and justice.”115 
Furthermore, a reviewing court may not overturn a grant of injunction 
merely because it would have decided the case differently.116 Indeed, “[a] 
reviewing court is never justified in substituting its discretion for that of 
the trial court.”117 Positively stated, a reviewing court must affirm a trial 
 108. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). 
 109. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660. 
 110. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931. 
 111. Id. at 931–32. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 772 (1993). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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judge’s grant of injunction if it “believes that a judicial mind could 
reasonably have reached the conclusion of the court below, or whether 
any reasonable person would agree with the trial court.”118 Obviously, 
this standard is very difficult to meet. Yet, as will be shown hereafter, the 
plurality all but ignores the high bar set here by Doran in finding the 
district court’s holding an abuse of discretion. 
b.  Presumptions of constitutionality on appeal. A central element of 
the plurality’s justification of the standard of review in Walsh is its 
determination that the Maine Rx statute is entitled to a presumption of 
validity on appeal.119 The plurality relies upon Davies Warehouse Co. v. 
Bowles120 in establishing that the Maine Rx statute is entitled to a 
presumption of validity.121 Davies stands, in relevant part, for the 
proposition that, in the context of a court reviewing potential preemption 
of state statutes on the merits, “[s]tate statutes . . . are entitled to the 
presumption of constitutionality until their invalidity is judicially 
declared.”122
The plurality argues that since the Secretary of Health had not 
otherwise held the Maine Rx statute to be in conflict with the Medicaid 
Act, the statute is therefore entitled to a presumption of constitutional 
validity, even, so it seems, on appeal concerning merely an award of 
injunction.123 However, it is highly questionable whether the 
presumption-of-validity principle in Davies is applicable to the current 
case. In Davies, the Court reviewed the preemption of state-legislated 
railroad regulation statutes by similar federal provisions. 124  It did so on 
the merits, and only after the specialty forums assigned to handle appeals 
specifically on those statutes had already passed their judgment on the 
same issue.125 In Walsh, the Court is only reviewing a grant of an 
injunction, and not the substantial validity of Maine Rx itself. 
Furthermore, the Department of Health and Human Services (the 
specialty forum assigned to review the States’ Medicaid plans) has not 
yet passed upon the validity of Maine Rx. 126 This is in stark contrast to 
the situation in Davies, where the merits of the preemption question had 
 118. Id. 
 119. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661–62. 
 120. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944). 
 121. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661. 
 122. Davies, 321 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). 
 123. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661–62. 
 124. Davies, 321 U.S. at 147. 
 125. The merits of federal preemption of the state railroad regulation statutes were passed 
upon by both the federal Price Administrator and the then-extant U.S. Emergency Court of Appeals 
before the Supreme Court addressed the issue again on the merits. Id. 
 126. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660. 
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already been passed upon by both of the forums assigned to hear 
challenges to railroad regulations.127 There is no suggestion in the Davies 
case that the presumption of validity is applicable when the merits of the 
statute to be accorded the presumption are not even at issue.128 Even if 
the Davies constitutional-presumption principle was applicable to 
interlocutory determinations at the trial level, at the appellate level, 
where a district court has already “judicially declared” the invalidity of 
the statute in question, that statute should be entitled to no such 
presumption.129
In accepting Doran’s casting of the standard of review, the plurality 
should have presumed the validity of the district court’s holding 
concerning the invalidity of the Maine Rx statute. On appeal, the correct 
presumption applicable when reviewing injunctions should be in favor of 
the district court’s determination, in keeping with the abuse of discretion 
standard. However, the plurality sharply diverges from this established 
standard by presuming the validity of the Maine Rx statute. If the 
presumption had been correctly made in PhRMA’s favor, Maine could 
never have carried its burden on appeal of proving abuse of discretion, 
since the record was insufficient to support Medicaid-related purposes to 
overcome PhRMA’s preemption argument. In this manner, the plurality 
mistakenly held in favor of Maine. 
c. The dissent and the arguments not made. In addition to the 
mistaken presumption of constitutional validity, the plurality’s decision 
is also based upon the very tenuous, and ultimately incorrect, conclusion 
that PhRMA failed to meet its burden by not making Maine’s arguments 
for it.130 The plurality finds that the district court’s grant of an injunction 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 128. Some may argue that when an appellate court reviews a grant of injunction, the 
underlying merits of the case in which the injunction is granted are brought into issue before the 
reviewing court as well. Such a contention is only partially accurate. In the context of an appellate 
review of a trial court’s grant of injunction, the abuse of discretion standard permits an inquiry into 
the underlying merits of the case only to the extent that such a review reveals that the trial judge did 
or did not abuse his discretion in finding that the moving party met its burden. See 36 C.J.S. Federal 
Courts § 598 (1993). Thus, the merits of the underlying case are only at issue at the appellate level 
insomuch as the appellate court may examine them to determine whether, based upon the record 
developed before the trial court, a reasonable judge could find that the moving party met its burden. 
See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 716, 772 (1993); 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 598. In addition, the 
highly deferential abuse of discretion standard suggests that a reviewing court should not interfere 
with a trial court’s equitable discretion merely because they may disagree with the outcome. See 
supra text accompanying notes 116–17. In summary, it is the trial judge’s evaluation of the moving 
party’s efforts to show that it has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits that is at issue on appeal, 
and not the merits themselves. Given this severely limited sense in which a reviewing court may 
properly address the underlying merits on appeal of a grant of injunction, I submit that the merits of 
the case are not truly at issue at all. 
 129. See supra text accompanying note 122. 
 130. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662–63. 
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was an abuse of discretion because PhRMA did not carry its burden at 
the trial court level by establishing that there were no possible Medicaid-
related purposes apparent from Maine Rx on its face. 131 As the dissent 
rightly points out, this was likewise a misapplication of the abuse of 
discretion standard because the argument effectively shifts the burden to 
PhRMA and the district court to formulate, raise, and consider all of 
Maine’s arguments on its behalf.132 Such an interpretation of the 
responsibilities of lower courts when considering motions for injunction 
is unreasonable, in that it requires judges to be partisan. In addition, its 
application on appeal does great violence to the deference normally 
accorded to their acts of judicial discretion when under appellate review. 
I argue that it also sets the burden on parties moving for injunctions 
unreasonably high and undermines the principal notions underpinning 
our adversarial system of justice. 
On appeal, PhRMA argues that since Maine did not raise any 
Medicaid-related purposes for Maine Rx in the district court, they were 
barred from doing so on appeal.133 The plurality maintains, however, that 
Maine’s failure to present Medicaid-related purposes for Maine Rx to the 
district court did not constitute a waiver of their ability to raise such 
considerations on appeal.134 According to its reasoning, since at the trial 
level PhRMA bore the heavy burden of “establishing, by a clear 
showing, a probability of success on the merits”, waiver theories were 
inapplicable to Maine’s appeal.135 The “State never represented that there 
was no Medicaid purpose served by its program; it simply argued that it 
did not need to offer one.”136 The plurality argues that since it could 
conceive of three possible Medicaid-related purposes (which were not 
presented to the district court), the grant of injunction “rested on an 
erroneous predicate.”137 This characterization of both PhRMA’s and the 
district court’s burden on appeal is entirely against the standard of 
review, not to mention an unreasonable distortion of the test for an 
injunction.138
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 687–90. 
 133. See id. at 662–663. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. at 662. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 663. 
 138. I allude to the plurality’s harsh interpretation of the test for an injunction. The Walsh 
plurality purports to adopt the injunction test from Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 
(per curiam). Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662. The Mazurek decision requires that the party moving for an 
injunction demonstrate, by a clear showing, that it is able to carry the burden of persuasion. 
Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. Although the requirement is undeniably high, ability to carry the burden 
of persuasion does not include the responsibility of proving inevitability of success, which seems to 
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The dissent offers some effective counters to the plurality’s 
arguments. The dissent notes first that the Maine Rx statute did not 
reveal any Medicaid-related purpose on its face.139 Far from it, Maine 
Rx’s explicitly stated goal is “to reduce prescription drug prices for 
residents of the State,” at the expense of benefits that would otherwise 
have been available to Medicaid beneficiaries without the statute’s 
interference.140 The dissent then argues that since Maine did not raise any 
other Medicaid-related purposes in the district court, it left the record 
void of any such arguments to evaluate on appeal for abuse of 
discretion.141 Therefore, the Medicaid-related purposes that the plurality 
suggests as possible candidates “rests on factual predicates that are not 
supported in the record.”142 Additionally, the dissent argues that each of 
the three Medicaid purposes the plurality advances are at best 
speculative, and as such it could not have been properly expected of the 
district court to develop and make such guesses of its own accord, 
especially when Maine had failed to do so itself.143 Expecting the district 
court to conceive of these arguments sua sponte is not in keeping with 
the abuse of discretion standard that the plurality purports to apply in this 
case. In fact, the dissent’s position serves to highlight just how badly the 
plurality’s arguments gore the deference usually due a district court when 
ruling on a discretionary act. As stated previously, the abuse of discretion 
standard should give substantial deference to the trial judge’s opinion.144 
In this case, the plurality overturns the district court’s holding not 
because it was biased or because it failed to consider relevant facts in the 
record, but because it did not create that record itself. Inasmuch as trial 
courts’ discretionary acts are usually afforded very wide latitude, the 
plurality’s opinion in this case tramples on an important assurance that 
the trial courts need to achieve just and equitable resolutions of difficult 
and complicated problems. 
be what the plurality requires. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662–63. In other words, PhRMA’s proper 
burden before the district court was demonstrating that, based upon the record before the Court, it 
will not lose. The district court believed that PhRMA did so. It is uncontested that PhRMA 
addressed and met every argument that Maine presented at the trial court proceedings, and that the 
district court was satisfied they could prevail on the merits based upon those proceedings. See 
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 658–59, 687–88. The Walsh plurality, however, would also require that PhRMA 
demonstrate success even beyond the record, requiring instead that PhRMA also counter arguments 
that its opponent never made. See id. Mazurek does not require such Herculean efforts. Mazurek, 520 
U.S. at 972. 
 139. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 688. 
 140. See id. at 687 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 2681(1), (2)(F), (7) (West Supp. 
2002)). 
 141. See id. at 688. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 688–89. 
 144. See supra text accompanying notes 113–18. 
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Furthermore, the plurality’s insistence that PhRMA anticipate and 
counter every possible contingency within Maine Rx that could serve as 
a Medicaid-related purpose, regardless of whether Maine argued such or 
not, simply because PhRMA “bore the burden of establishing . . . a 
probability of success on the merits[,]”145 places an unreasonably high 
burden on it, even given the already-stringent burden plaintiffs normally 
bear when seeking an injunction.146 The plurality is mistaken in requiring 
such an exacting showing from PhRMA. Even given the plurality’s test 
that PhRMA’s burden before the district court was to establish by a clear 
showing that it had a probability of success on the merits,147 this is still a 
different standard than requiring PhRMA to explore and counter every 
conceivable argument that Maine could make, which is truly what the 
plurality appears to expect.148 Such a standard is unobtainable in most 
instances, because there are usually innumerable possible arguments that 
any party can make on any given issue. Many of these possible 
arguments may have little or no merit, because they might consider 
extremely remote factual possibilities. In proceedings on the merits of 
the issue, such remote possibilities would most likely be considered 
frivolous, and the plaintiff would not need to counter them to actually 
succeed on the merits, let alone demonstrate a probability of success 
against such arguments. Thus, it is a mistake for the plurality to interpret 
PhRMA’s burden as requiring such an impossible and exacting showing 
at the district court level. 
Finally, the plurality’s expectation that either PhRMA or the district 
court anticipate and consider all of Maine’s arguments for it, even those 
that the State did not make, and for which there is no support from facts 
in the record, is mistaken because it undermines our adversarial system 
of justice. In Perry v. Leeke, Justice Marshall observed that “[t]he 
paramount importance of vigorous representation follows from the nature 
of our adversarial system of justice. This system is premised on the well-
tested principle that truth—as well as fairness—is best discovered by 
powerful statements on both sides of the question.”149 Our entire legal 
system is predicated upon the supposition that when two parties advocate 
their positions fervently before a neutral arbiter, the truth can be more 
clearly seen. Requiring one party to make the arguments for the other, or 
requiring such of the neutral arbiter, turns this system on its head, and 
 145. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662. 
 146. See supra text accompanying note 138. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662. 
 149. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 291 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
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only lends confusion and inequality to an otherwise well-established 
process. Moreover, such requirements give the nonmoving party the 
perverse incentive to tread more frequently on the rights of the moving 
party. This is because under this system the nonmovant has virtually no 
responsibility to mount a defense, while the movant must himself 
shoulder the impossible burden of developing and addressing all of the 
defendant’s arguments, or face a refusal of remedy. This absurd result 
could not possibly have been the plurality’s intention, but its 
interpretation of the standard of review in Walsh suggests exactly this 
consequence. Therefore, the plurality’s interpretation of the standard is 
wrong. 
 
2.  No other justification for the plurality’s standard 
 
Given the arguments above, I explore now whether the plurality 
could have more effectively ignored the standard of review altogether to 
achieve a sounder result. One possible approach, which I will explore 
below, has been used to completely overcome the standard of review. 
However, this device is strictly limited to certain circumstances that 
necessarily call for exception, and the facts at issue in Walsh do not 
justify deviance from the normal standard. 
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, the Court held that the issues of the case were ripe for 
decision, even though it was still in the process of interlocutory appeal.150 
In bypassing the usual standard of review to reach the merits of the case, 
the Court made the unusual observation that “a court of appeals 
ordinarily will limit its review in a case of this kind to abuse of discretion 
is a rule of orderly judicial administration, not a limit on judicial 
power.”151 However, the Court also strictly limited such an interpretation 
of the standard to cases where there is “an unusually complete factual 
record and legal presentation from which to address the important [] 
issues at stake.”152 Thus, where the record is still underdeveloped, as in 
Walsh, this exception does not apply.153
Thornburgh illustrates the extreme circumstances that are required 
for a court to ignore the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
trial court’s award of an injunction. It was not enough for the plurality in 
Walsh to disagree with the district court’s decision to award PhRMA an 
 150. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755–57 (1986) 
(overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
 151. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 757 n.8. 
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injunction to overturn that decision. Indeed, it has been noted that “[t]he 
fact that the appellate court would have decided otherwise does not 
establish an abuse of discretion.”154 Rather, to overcome the extremely 
deferential abuse of discretion standard, an extremely well-developed 
record and strictly circumscribed legal issues are required. As neither of 
these elements are present in Walsh,155 the plurality has no existing 
justification for treating the abuse of discretion standard as a lower 
plenary review standard. 
In light of the arguments made above, it is difficult to see how the 
plurality reached the holding that it did. Indeed, I submit that the only 
conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that because the plurality 
is mistaken in the way it addresses the abuse of discretion standard, it 
should not have overturned the district court’s grant of injunction, but 
should have held in PhRMA’s favor. 
 
B.  Getting it Right by Getting it Wrong 
 
Rather ironically, although the plurality, procedurally speaking, was 
incorrect in overturning the injunction against Maine Rx, and should 
have found in favor of PhRMA, this does not mean that its decision is 
wrong. Ultimately, the Court must balance the core interests clashing in 
Walsh, human lives and corporate profits. Faced with such a decision, 
equity and sound policy require a result in Maine’s favor. Furthermore, 
the plurality’s decision to hold in Maine’s favor opens a valuable door in 
the pressing area of healthcare reform. The aid that this decision will 
give to States as they work towards much-needed healthcare reforms has 
been, and will likely continue to be, invaluable in achieving greater 
access to healthcare services. For these two reasons, the plurality, in 
holding against the standard of review, arguably achieves a more just 
result than if it had correctly applied the standard. 
 
1.  Doing justice and equity 
 
a.  Healthcare and the problem of access. One of the most urgent 
problems facing healthcare in America is the problem of access. In 2004, 
45.8 million Americans went without any health insurance for all or part 
of the year.156 This number represents a trend in growth, especially 
among those who work part-time, where the number of uninsured rose by 
 154. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 772. 
 155. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660. 
 156. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2004, 16 (2005). 
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almost 3% in one year, and also amongst those households that had an 
annual income of between $50,000 and $75,000, where the number of 
uninsured rose by almost 10,000 in one year.157 Worse than this, some 70 
million Americans had no insurance for prescription drugs in 2004.158 
This number may be ameliorated in the future somewhat by the provision 
of the new Medicare drug benefit, albeit perhaps not as extensively as 
some previously believed it would.159 In the end, however, these numbers 
reflect the reality that there is a sizable population that does not have any 
aid available to it to offset out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare, 
especially on prescription drugs. 
One recent study noted that “[e]xpenditures for prescription drugs in 
the United States are increasing much faster than total health 
spending.”160 Indeed, the Kaiser Family Foundation reported that in 
2002, spending on prescription drugs totaled $162.4 billion, an increase 
of 15% from the previous year, reflecting a trend that has held 
substantially constant for eight years.161 Additionally, the prices of 
prescription drugs have continued to steadily climb at an average rate of 
7.4% for the last decade, more than double the average inflation rate of 
2.5%.162 This means that drug prices are continuing to increase at a 
dramatic rate, while prescription drug coverage continues to shrink. The 
logical result is that many of this population have to forego utilization of 
prescription drugs. One 2003 survey found that “37% of the uninsured 
said they did not fill a prescription because of cost, compared to 13% of 
the insured.”163
It is now well-accepted that many medical conditions are easily 
treatable with access to the right medicines, and yet a growing number of 
people must do without, because they cannot afford the medicines they 
need, to the endangerment of their health and, in certain cases, their lives. 
b.  The pharmaceutical industry. In contrast, the pharmaceutical 
industry is, in all respects, very healthy. In 2004, the top twenty drug 
manufacturers made approximately $332.5 billion in sales.164 According 
 157. Id. at 18. 
 158. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 805. 
 159. See Bruce Stuart, et al., Assessing The Impact of Coverage Gaps in the Medicare Part D 
Drug Benefit, HEALTH AFF., (2005) available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint 
/hlthaff.w5.167v1.** 
 160. AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, Making Medicines Affordable: the Price 
Factor (2000) at *2, APHA Position Paper 20006, May 13, 2004, at *2, available at 
http://www.apha.org/legislative/testimonies/FDAimportComments5_13.pdf. 
 161. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Prescription Drug Trends, October 2004, 
at *1, http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004-UPDATE.pdf. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at *2. 
 164. M. Asif Ismail, Special Report: Drug Lobby Second to None, How the Pharmaceutical 
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to recent raw data, the pharmaceutical industry, as a whole, garnered 
$20.3 billion dollars in net profits in 2004, outstripping every other 
American industry by at least $5 billion.165 The same data revealed that 
these earnings represent a profit-to-revenue ratio of 18.9%, the largest 
profit ratio of any industry in America, at almost 7% more than the next 
highest industry.166 Of its total expenditures for 2004, the pharmaceutical 
industry spent nearly $60 billion on marketing for its products, as 
opposed to the approximately $30 billion it spent on research and 
development, undercutting the industry’s arguments that programs like 
Maine Rx will do long-term harm to society because they will reduce 
available funds for research and development of new drugs.167 These data 
demonstrate that pharmaceutical manufacturers, unlike the uninsured 
American public, are in excellent shape. 
c.  The balancing of equities. Procedural considerations aside, 
Maine’s most powerful argument lies in equitable principles. Maine 
deserves a ruling in its favor not because it has the sounder legal 
argument, but because the stakes involved weigh heavier on the State’s 
side. PhRMA’s most pressing interest in opposing Maine Rx was its 
bottom line. By allowing Maine residents to purchase prescription drugs 
at reduced prices, which are funded by the rebates that the State 
leverages from the pharmaceutical manufacturers, Maine Rx requires 
those manufacturers to fund the drug benefit. The rebates that the 
manufacturers would have to pay the State would effectively reduce the 
amount of profits manufacturers could make otherwise. The drug 
companies stand to lose a significant amount of money in lost profits, 
due to the reduced profit margin imposed by the rebate program. At stake 
for Maine, however, is the ability to increase access to prescription drugs 
for its residents, and thereby improve, or even save, lives of residents. By 
offering reduced prices on needed drugs for those who are too poor to 
afford better health insurance, but who have too much to qualify for 
Medicaid assistance, Maine Rx offers a reasonable way to improve 
access. In the end, Walsh pitted human life against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ profit. Given this calculus, it seems only natural that 
Industry Gets its Way in Washington, Center for Public Integrity (July 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=723.
 165. Bernard Sanders, New Figures Prove Pharmaceutical Industry Continues to Fleece 
Americans, (Oct. 30, 2005). http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/profits.asp 
 166. Id. 
 167. Ismail, supra note 164. See also, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Impact of 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on Prescription Drug Spending, Jun. 2003, at 7, available at 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378 
(detailing how industry spending on certain forms of advertising is not essential to continued 
increases in drug spending). 
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Maine, with the more deserving equities hanging in the balance, should 
have prevailed, no matter what the procedural defects its case 
encountered. It is in light of these weightier considerations that the 
plurality’s decision, although mistaken in application of the standard of 
review, nevertheless seems to be more in line with a sense of justice and 
equity, as well as better public policy. 
 
2.  What was gained and what was lost 
 
a.  Reforming healthcare. By deciding against the injunction against 
Maine Rx, the plurality afforded States greater ease and power in 
accomplishing healthcare reform. Given the number of Americans who 
believe that healthcare reform is a vital goal,168 the plurality’s decision is 
arguably justified by a compelling public policy to encourage effective 
reform. The plurality’s decision encourages reform by sustaining the 
States’ use of police powers to provide for their uninsured residents. 
While it is true that the plurality attempted to limit the impact of its 
ruling specifically to injunction cases where the state healthcare action in 
question has not yet been reviewed by the Secretary of Health,169 I 
believe that the inevitable result has been, and will continue to be, much 
more expansive in effect. For example, the plurality’s ruling with regard 
to PhRMA’s dormant Commerce Clause argument170 found much greater 
support, with only Justices Scalia and Thomas abstaining therefrom.171 
This showing of solidarity will most likely preclude future challenges to 
States’ healthcare reform efforts (ala Maine Rx), through use of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.172 In addition, the plurality’s arguments 
dealing with the issue of federal preemption provide reform-minded 
lower courts with some ammunition for upholding State healthcare 
reform efforts against challenges by drug companies seeking to protect 
their wide profit margins. For courts that are less “activist,” the Walsh 
 168. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, March/April2005 Health Poll Report 
Survey, Apr. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/March-April-2005-
Kaiser-Health-Poll-Report-Toplines.pdf. 
 169. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660–61. 
 170. I have deliberately chosen not to widely discuss this already-well-explored area of the 
Walsh opinion, but the effect that this aspect of the opinion has, and will continue to have, on 
healthcare reform is too important to remain completely untouched. Thus, I recognize it here as 
perhaps the single greatest contribution of the opinion to state healthcare reform efforts. 
 171. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 683. 
 172. See e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America v. Walsh: The Supreme Court Allows States to Proceed with Expanding Access to Drugs, 4 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 69, 83 (2004); Jessica S. Intermill, Note, Take Two and Call 
Your Legislator in the Morning: What States Can Learn From Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of 
America v. Walsh, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 265, 293–95 (2004). 
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opinions, particularly the two concurrences, give some power to lower 
courts to aid state healthcare reform programs like Maine Rx by 
encouraging them to defer to the Secretary of Health whenever 
possible.173 Perhaps most importantly, the plurality’s opinion aides State 
healthcare reform by sustaining the States’ use of their police powers to 
“protect[] the health of its uninsured residents” in the face of commercial 
challenges, even when the exercise of such powers overflows into areas 
governed by federal statutes.174
b.  Dilution of potency through procedural flaws and fracture. 
Inasmuch as the plurality’s opinion is a boon to States’ efforts at 
healthcare reform, its impact may still be muted somewhat for two 
reasons. First, the procedural flaws with the plurality’s opinion take away 
from the force of its arguments by weakening its credibility. The dissent 
points out the most glaring problems with the plurality’s application of 
the abuse of discretion standard,175 and I have supplemented and 
expanded those arguments to illustrate the validity of the dissent’s 
position in this regard. The procedural flaws of the plurality’s position 
may weaken the impact that the decision could have. Nevertheless, in a 
choice between aiding state healthcare reform and protecting drug 
company profits, I believe that the plurality’s decision ended up the wiser 
part, even if that decision costs some precedential weight through lack of 
credible procedural foundation. After all, such observations do not 
change the fact that the plurality’s opinion remains, for all intents and 
purposes, the preeminent opinion of the case, which lower courts are 
bound to follow. 
Second, Walsh’s impact on healthcare reform may also lose potency 
simply because the Court was so fractured in its decision. A greater 
showing of solidarity could have done more to support the cause of state-
initiated healthcare reform by giving challenging parties less incentive to 
bring suits that they know will most likely fail on appeal, given the 
definiteness of the Court’s position on the matter. Walsh’s efficacy may 
be diminished because challengers will see a weak and divided Supreme 
Court that may turn its way on the very next case. 
 
C.  Looking Toward a Brighter Future—Hope for Continued Reform 
 
1.  Minor changes and subsequent litigation 
 
Immediately after the Court’s decision in Walsh, the legislature of 
 173. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660–61, 670–84. 
 174. Id. at 666. 
 175. See Id. at 684–90. 
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Maine, to avoid future litigation and the need to submit the program for 
approval by the Secretary of Health, altered Maine Rx somewhat to 
address some of the contentions PhRMA raised during the prior 
litigation.176 A minor change that the Maine legislature made was the 
removal of the anti-racketeering provisions in the original Maine Rx 
statute, which the district court held unconstitutional in the prior 
litigation, and which the Maine legislature never appealed. The Maine 
legislature also changed eligibility provisions in the program, this time 
explicitly linking eligibility for enrollment with financial 
considerations.177 To signify the new status of the program, the Maine 
legislature also renamed the program “Maine Rx Plus.”178 Commenting 
on the changes, Maine’s Attorney General speculates that the new 
“program meets all the standards and guidelines of (Central Medical 
services, the agency that oversees the federal Medicare and Medicaid 
programs). We think there’s no need for prior approval.”179
As it turns out, the changes did not discourage PhRMA from filing 
another suit against Maine, seeking to force the State to submit its 
program to the Secretary of Health for approval and also to enjoin it from 
implementing Maine Rx Plus pending the Secretary’s review.180 This 
time, however, the district court denied PhRMA the injunction.181 The 
court accepted Maine’s reasoning that since Maine changed its statute, 
PhRMA’s claims were not yet ripe for review; especially considering 
that the new statute would not impose the prior approval provisions of 
the statute against nonparticipating drugs until October of 2005.182 Such 
a holding does not, of course, definitively decide the validity of Maine’s 
program. However, it may foreshadow a subtle shift in the district court’s 
view of programs like Maine Rx Plus. Only time will tell. 
 
2.  The spread of Maine Rx Plus 
 
Other developments since Walsh are much more positive for state 
 176. Meg Haskell, Maine Rx Plus Ready to Roll: 275,000 Eligible for Discount Drugs, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did= 
529012371&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientid=9338&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
 177. The financial eligibility requirements under the new law are quite generous, much more 
so than for Medicaid enrollment. The statute extends eligibility to all residents who are 350% above 
the federal poverty level, or whose unreimbursed prescription drug costs total 5% of family income, 
or whose total unreimbursed medical expenses equal 15% or more of family income ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22 § 2681 (2)(F) (West Supp. 2005). 
 178. Haskell, supra note 176. 
 179. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 180. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Nicholas, 353 F. Supp. 2d 231, 232 (D. R.I. 2005). 
 181. See id. at 246. 
 182. See id. at 239–46. 
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healthcare reform. In particular, the State of California is currently 
considering adopting a drug benefit program very similar to Maine Rx 
Plus.183 Perhaps this development in the nation’s most populous state 
indicates that States have been emboldened by the plurality’s decision in 
Walsh, and are beginning to more fully exercise their police powers, now 
that they are free to do so without the fear of at least a dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge, and perhaps even some preemption 
challenges as well. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Although the plurality’s reasoning in Walsh rests on a flawed 
procedural foundation, the future of healthcare reform is brighter because 
of its decision. The sustaining of States’ use of their police powers to 
provide for the healthcare needs of their uninsured populations can only 
be a good thing, even despite technical inaccuracies that should have 
rendered a different decision. 
Who is to say what the true effects of that decision will be? Walsh 
will at least stem some of the massive growth in prescription drug costs 
in certain jurisdictions, which may, in turn, improve overall health 
through the improvement of early access to necessary medications by 
those who could not otherwise afford them, and are otherwise ineligible 
for Medicaid. But maybe its influence will reach even further. Perhaps 
programs like Maine Rx Plus will be models for future programs that 
cover ambulatory care by promoting the solicitation of “rebates” from 
HMO’s, MCO’s and hospitals. Walsh allows States to use those tools at 
their disposal to provide for those who cannot afford health insurance or 
other drug benefits. Maybe, by reaffirming the use of police powers in 
fostering programs like Maine Rx Plus, Walsh will be the first of the 
necessary catalysts that will allow a jump to universal healthcare.184 
 183. Jeff Tuttle, Rx Plans Compete on Ballot in Calif.: One Initiative Like Maine Rx Plus, 
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did= 
529012371&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientid=9338&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
 184. For the purposes of this note, I operate from the premise that universal healthcare is a 
desirable goal. I recognize, however, that the debate on the desirability and feasibility of universal 
healthcare is complex and often heated, and as such, a significant treatment of this topic is well 
beyond the scope of this note. For an interesting look at arguments concerning these issues, see 
James B. Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health Care and Why We Need 
It Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013 (2001) (discussing arguments in favor of universal health 
care); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do? National Health Reform Abroad, 
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433 (2004) (examining European universal health care models and how they 
facilitate similar reforms in the U.S.); William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law That Shapes the 
United States Health Care System: Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the Established 
Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151 (2006) (analyzing the feasibility of movement toward 
universal health care in the U.S.). 
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Wherever Walsh may lead in the future, in situations like this, I find it 
interesting that members of the Supreme Court can make the right 
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